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[L.A. No. 21870.

In Bank.

July 3, 1951.]

JOSEPH CAPITAIN, Respondent, v. L. A. WRECKING
COMPANY et al., Appellants.
[1] Sales-Passage of Title-Risk of Loss.-Generally risk of loss
falls on the seller if title has not passed, and on the buyer
if it has. (Civ. Code,§§ 1738,1739, 1742.)
[2] !d.-Passage of Title-Risk of Loss.-Seller suffers the loss
resulting from burning of a house after it had been moved
to the buyer's property, pursuant to a contract for its sale
and delivery, but while it still rested on the mover's blocks,
and before part of the roof, which had been temporarily
removed, had been restored, where an intent that delivery
was not to be completed until the house was on the foundation
is evidenced by a notation, on the contract, authorized by the
seller calling for payment of a balance when the house was
on the foundation, and where the purchase contemplated a
complete unit with a roof. (Civ. Code § 1739(5).)
[3] !d.-Passage of Title-Intention of Parties.-Since a contract
for sale and delivery of a house gives the buyer an insurable
interest therein he is entitled to insure it for the protection
of one loaning him money for the purchase regardless of who
has title, and his agreement to do so is not conclusive as
showing an intent that title pass before the house is moved.
[4] !d.-Passage of Title-Payment.-Under a contract for sale
and delivery of a house naming a figure as the "full price"
of the house, but stating the sale to be subject to the additional
cost of moving, and specifying a maximum total delivered
price, payment, before the house is moved, of the sum described as "the full price" of the house does not conclusively
establish that title was then to pass, in view of the balance
which, while it might be allocated to the moving expense, is
still part of the maximum which the buyer promised to pay.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Ralph McGee, Judge.* Affirmed.
Action for damages for building destroyed by fire.
ment for plaintiff affirmed.·

Judg-

[1] See 22 Cal.Jur. 944; 46 Am.Jur. 463.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Sales, § 108; [2] Sales, § 107; [3]
Sales, § 84; [ 4] Sales, § 98 (1).
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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Bloom & Bloom and Eleanor V. Jackson for Appellants.
Barry Sullivan for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-The trial court found that on December 17,
1947, defendants, L. A. Wrecking Company, a partnership,
and the partners, the owners of a house situated on a lot in
Los Angeles, entered into an agreement to sell the house to
plaintiff and move it to Bandini, California, for a total sum
not exceeding $6,500 delivered. A $500 deposit or down
payment was made and thereafter on April 2, 1948, a second
deposit of $3,000 was made and accepted while the house was
still at its original location. The balance of $3,000 was to
be paid when the house was placed on the foundation at the
new location. Defendants employed the M & M House
Moving Company to move the building, which it did on May
3, 1948, and placed it on "sills and blocks," the property
of the mover, at the new location. It was to be lowered to
the foundation by the mover. For the purpose of moving,
a ''top portion'' of the top of the building had to be removed.
On May 10, 1948, seven days after the moving, the house
was destroyed by fire. At that time the portion of the roof
had not been replaced, defendants had placed tarpaulins on
the house to protect it, tools and equipment for replacing
the roof were in the house, materials for the job were present
at the new location and the house had not been placed upon
the foundation. The court concluded that at the time of
the fire, defendants had possession and control of the building
and plaintiff should recover $3,587.50-the amount deposited
plus sales tax-from defendants and the latter take nothing
on its cross-complaint.
Defendants contend that title to the house had passed
to plaintiff when it was placed on the blocks and sills, and
therefore the risk of loss was upon plaintiff at the time of
the fire.
The applicable legal principles are conceded by the parties.
[1] With certain exceptions not here pertinent, the risk of
loss falls upon the seller if title has not passed, and on the
buyer, if it has. (Civ. Code, § 1742.) "(1) Where there
is a contract to sell specific or ascertained goods, the property
in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties
to the contract intend it to be transferred. (2) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties, regard shall
be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties,

,July 1951]

CAPITAIN

v. L. A.

WRECKING Co.

529

[37 C.2d 527; 233 P .2d 544]

usages of trade and the circumstances of the case.'' ( Civ.
Code, § 1738.) "Unless a different intention appears, the
following are rules for ascertaining the intention of the
parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is
to pass to the buyer. . . . Rule 5. If the contract to sell
requires the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer, or at a
particular place, or to pay the freight or cost of transportation to the buyer, or to a particular place, the property does
not pass until the goods have been delivered to the buyer or
reached the place agreed upon." ( Civ. Code, § 1739.) It
remains therefore to ascertain whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the conclusion that the risk of loss rested
with defendants-sellers.
The contract was dated December 17, 1947, drawn under
the letterhead of defendants, and recited that $500 had been
paid by plaintiff to defendants as a deposit on the house at
a specified location "which is to be moved to approximately
S.E. Cor. of Couts and Panocha Streets, Bandini, California." "Full price of" house-$3,500-less $500 deposit to
be paid by plaintiff when application to move has been approved by Los Angeles. The "sale (is) subject to approval
of buyer to the additional cost of moving.'' The total price
is not to exceed '' $6,500.00 delivered.'' Defendants have the
right to cancel the contract under specified contingencies by
refunding all money received. On April 2, 1948, plaintiff
had made arrangements for payments under the contract to
be made by Atlantic Savings and Loan Association, with
whom he had arranged for a loan. On that day in the presence of plaintiff and Chain, one of the defendants-partners-a notation was made in handwriting on the contract
by Dinoto, a representative of Atlantic, that "4/2/48, I, John
Capitain, [plaintiff] hereby authorize the Atlantic Savings
and Loan Association, to pay to L. A. Wrecking Co. [defendants] balance due on the contract when building is [placed]
on the foundation. Signed : John Capitain. '' The notation
was made ensuing a conversation between plaintiff and Chain
as to when the balance of $3,000 would be paid, and plaintiff
had said he would pay when the house was on the foundation
and, according to plaintiff's testimony, the wording of it was
dictated by Chain. Another notation placed on the contract
at the same time by Chain reads: "Received $3087.50 as a
further deposit, balance due $3000." In other conversations
defendants agreed to replace the portion of the roof and some
bay windows which were removed in the process of moving;
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that the house was to be placed on the ground at a point
designated by plaintiff; that ''after the foundation was made
the defendants were to lower this house down onto the foundation, secure it to the foundation''; and that defendants told
plaintiff the house was fully covered by insurance until delivered and all work finished. In the agreement between
defendants and the mover, for moving the house, the mover
agreed to lower it onto the foundation.
[2] Defendants do not dispute, and it is clear from the
contract, that it was one for the sale of property which was
to be delivered to a certain place by the sellers-defendantsand thus rule 5 of section 1739 of the Civil Code, quoted
supra, applies. The only question remaining is when the
delivery to the place was consummated. It is true the
contract in the first part mentions delivery to the lot alone.
There are, however, other factors and circumstances which
would justify an inference that the delivery would not be
complete, and therefore, title would not pass, until the house
was lowered onto the foundation and the roof restored. There
is the first notation made thereon on April 2, 1948, at defendants' dictation, that the $3,000 balance is to be paid
when the house is lowered onto the foundation, indicating
that the delivery by the sellers was not to be completed until
the building was on the foundation. The plaintiff was purchasing a whole house as a unit, not in parts, hence it may
be said that the house was not delivered until the roof, which
had been removed, had been restored, and thus a complete
house delivered. The house was setting on blocks which
belonged to the mover. It is true that it was plaintiff's
obligation to build the foundation, and he had not done so
when the fire occurred, but there was no time fixed for the
construction of the foundation, and only seven days, not an
unreasonable time, had elapsed since the house was placed
on the blocks. There had been a long delay on defendants'
part in moving the house. Defendants had lumber and equipment on the property to be used in replacing the roof, and
some work had been done in that respect. Considering all
of the circumstances it may be inferred that title did not pass
before the fire.
[3] Defendants refer to evidence that plaintiff, in arranging for a loan with Atlantic Savings and Loan Association,
agreed with the latter to insure the house. That is not controlling, as the contract gave plaintiff an insurable interest,
and he had a right to protect the lender regardless of where

July 1951

BLACHE

v.

BLACHE

531

[37 C.2d 531; 233 P .2d 547]

title was. It is not conclusive that plaintiff understood or
intended title to pass. Moreover, defendants repeatedly assured plaintiff that they were fully covered by insurance,
with respect to the house, even while it was on the blocks.
[4] The same comment is applicable to the assertion that the
full price of the house-$3,500-was paid before it was moved.
That might indicate that title was to pass then but it is not
conclusive. There was still a balance of $3,000 which, while
it might be allocated to the moving expense, was still a part
of the $6,500 which was to be the maximum amount plaintiff
agreed in the contract to pay.
Judgment affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J·., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied August 2.
1951.

[S. F. No. 17997.

In Bank.

July 6, 1951.]

ANNA BLACHE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MAURICE J.
BLACHE et al., Defendants and Appellants.
[1] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Evidence at Former

Trial.-On a second trial of an action for separate maintenance and a determination of property rights, it is prejudicial
error to allow plaintiff, over objection, to rest her case principally on the transcript of her testimony in the first trial, where
such testimony on its face appears to be evasive and selfcontradictory and is the sole basis for essential findings in
plaintiff's favor.
[2] Evidence-Hearsay-Evidence at Former Trial.-In the absence of an agreement by the attorneys, or by the parties if
not represented by counsel, the use of evidence at a former
trial may be permitted only if the witness' testimony in
court cannot be produced. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870(8).)
[3] Appeal- Affirmance- E:ffect.-A purported and inadvertent
affirmance of a nonexistent portion of a judgment has no effect.
[2] See 10 Cal.Jur. 1175; 20 Am.Jur. 578.
McK Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1553; [2] Evi·
deuce, § 273; [3] Appeal and Error, § 1387; [ 4] Appeal and Error,
§ 1357.

